Unequivocal Justice (PDF) difficulties the dominating view within political philosophy that broadly totally free-market routines are irregular with the standard concepts of liberal egalitarian justice. Freiman argues that the liberal egalitarian rejection of totally free-market regimes rests on an essential methodological error. Liberal egalitarians routinely presume a perfect “public interest” design of political habits and a nonideal “private interest” design of habits in the market and civil society. Freiman argues that this unbalanced application of behavioral presumptions predispositions the analysis and damages perfect theoretical treatments of every significant liberal egalitarian concept, consisting of political liberty, financial sufficiency, reasonable chance, and social equality. This ebook reconsiders the institutional ramifications of each of these concepts in nonideal conditions, making unique philosophical usage of political psychology and public option economics along the method.
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